AUKUS is a two-stage defense agreement formed in 2021 by the United States of America (USA), the United Kingdom (UK), and Australia implemented as part of endeavors to constrain China’s influence in the Asia-Pacific region.[1] The first phase of AUKUS involves Australia purchasing eight to ten nuclear-powered submarines from the USA and UK over the next three decades, while the second phase focuses on sharing knowledge in new advanced defense technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing and cyber capabilities.[2]
Examining the risks and challenges of New Zealand’s participation in AUKUS is important for understanding regional strategic dynamics and New Zealand’s national interests, given the ongoing debates regarding its involvement in the second phase, despite the absence of a proposal for its inclusion in the first phase, owing to New Zealand’s long-standing history of nuclear disarmament.
In July 2023, the New Zealand Government released a new national security strategy.[3] This new security strategy is fundamentally based on four main principles. The first principle refers to New Zealand’s geopolitical uniqueness characterized by its liberal, independent, and multicultural democracy. The strategy, grounded in the second principle, highlights 12 national security challenges ranging from terrorism and climate change to attempts undermining New Zealand democracy. While none of the challenges constituting these security issues have been prioritized, there is a clear emphasis on threats within the framework of geostrategic competition and threats to the rules-based international system.
Another principle emphasizes the importance of partnerships. As it is known, Australia is the New Zealand’s closest partner and sole formal ally. Within this framework, Australia has been deemed indispensable for New Zealand’s security. Lastly, along with the pursuit of peaceful cooperation in areas of mutual interest, China’s elevation of its global image has been regarded as a primary driver of geopolitical shifts.
When evaluating New Zealand’s potential participation in the second phase of AUKUS, the government considers it crucial to assess how this agreement could contribute to national interests, taking into account the core principles outlined in the country’s new national security strategy and its geopolitical position. Given New Zealand’s independent foreign policy based on non-nuclear security and closer relations with the Pacific, participating in the second pillar of AUKUS could potentially jeopardize New Zealand’s independent foreign policy and pose significant risks to its global standing.
Secondly, within the context of the new security strategy, which addresses national security issues such as terrorism and climate change while emphasizing geostrategic competition and threats to the international system, it is worth considering how AUKUS could contribute to these challenges and how New Zealand might respond to its current security dilemmas. On the other hand, few Pacific nations perceive AUKUS as addressing climate change as a primary security threat or consider it as having a “non-nuclear” component. Particularly, ASEAN countries view this as “establishing a vain antagonistic relationship with China”.[4]
Within the scope of the new security strategy, Australia has been stated to be a vital partner for New Zealand’s security. It has long been acknowledged by both parties that Australia is New Zealand’s closest and most significant ally. On the other hand, considering Australia’s strong relations with the United States, tighter cooperation could entail the risk of New Zealand becoming more dependent on the strategic influences of the United States.
Indeed, Australian critics argue that AUKUS is a strategic initiative that could lock its members into special US trade controls, jeopardize research independence and hinder international research and development cooperation.[5] Especially, given the uncertainties surrounding the upcoming presidential elections scheduled for November this year, following USA policies could be a risky strategy.
Close relations with Australia do not necessarily imply that New Zealand’s participation in AUKUS aligns with its strategic interests. Although New Zealand places emphasis on its bilateral relationship with Australia, the government acknowledges the particularly strong economic ties with China and expresses its commitment to continue fostering positive relations with China.
New Zealand’s unique worldview is not fully compatible with the AUKUS countries’ approach to China. As a matter of fact, China is New Zealand’s largest trading partner. New Zealand’s inclusion in AUKUS, which also includes the United States and Australia, both of which are seen as strategic rivals by China, risks disrupting economic relations with China.
According to New Zealand’s national security strategy, the current security environment is confronted with a number of challenges. The key question in this case is whether access to cutting-edge defense technologies in the second pillar of AUKUS will help alleviate these challenges for a relatively small actor like New Zealand. Given the fact that AUKUS does not hold a monopoly on new defense technologies, there is little evidence to suggest that participation in the second pillar would significantly enhance New Zealand’s unique interests and values in the Indo-Pacific region or other areas.[6] Moreover, participating in a controversial defense arrangement aimed at funding science, research, and innovation raises questions about how New Zealand evaluates its strategic interests, especially considering the potential risk it poses to other significant international relationships.
Although the second pillar of AUKUS is discussed within the framework of non-nuclear cooperation, second pillar technologies, including artificial intelligence, are already contributing to the modernization of the USA and UK’s nuclear weapons command and distribution systems. This situation is incompatible with the principles of the Treaty of Rarotonga, which established a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific and prohibited the use, possession, storage and, most importantly, deployment of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, this situation carries the potential risk of undermining New Zealand’s national nuclear disarmament laws and its diplomatic stance supporting international agreements, as New Zealand has played a pioneering role in nuclear disarmament.
Amid discussions about the potential participation of like-minded countries such as Canada, South Korea, and Japan in AUKUS, New Zealand’s accession to AUKUS could accelerate the division of two major blocs worldwide, thereby increasing tensions in the region.
Currently, concerns persist among Pacific Island and ASEAN countries that New Zealand’s potential participation in the second pillar of AUKUS could exacerbate great power competition. This situation is thought to potentially weaken New Zealand’s regional leadership and diminish the importance of local national security concerns such as climate change. It also carries the risk of undermining New Zealand’s diplomatic stance as an independent, rules-based, non-nuclear Oceanian country distinct from its traditional allies. In this context, it can be said that safeguarding New Zealand’s interests and values can be best ensured through a cautious approach towards AUKUS. Before making a final decision, it will be crucial for New Zealand to consider its relationship with Beijing, its largest trading partner, and take into account the aforementioned geopolitical risks.
[1] “AUKUS security partnership” UK Parliament, House of Lords Library, https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/aukus-security-partnership/, (Date of Access: 02.05.2024).
[2] Ibid.
[3] “NZ’s first national security strategy signals a ‘turning point’ and the end of old certainties”, The Conversation, https://theconversation.com/nzs-first-national-security-strategy-signals-a-turning-point-and-the-end-of-old-certainties-210885, (Date of Access: 02.05.2024).
[4] “NZ started discussing AUKUS involvement in 2021, newly released details reveal”, The Conversation, https://theconversation.com/nz-started-discussing-aukus-involvement-in-2021-newly-released-details-reveal-228776, (Date of Access: 03.05.2024).
[5] Ibid.
[6] “Moving closer to Australia is in New Zealand’s strategic interest – joining AUKUS is not”, The Conversation, https://theconversation.com/moving-closer-to-australia-is-in-new-zealands-strategic-interest-joining-aukus-is-not-223843, (Date of Access: 03.05.2024).
