The accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in late 2022, has radically altered Europe’s security architecture. Does the decision of these two Scandinavian countries, which have maintained their neutrality for many years, to come under NATO’s umbrella signal a significant shift in regional and global balances? Or was it a move to encourage other countries in the region to join NATO, as NATO’s enlargement would limit Russia’s military activities in the Baltic Sea region?
In order to evaluate the role of Sweden and Finland in NATO and its regional-global impacts, Ankara Center for Crisis and Political Studies (ANKASAM) made an interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Walter Rick Landgraf, Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI).
1. Article 42-7 of the EU Treaty. Article 42-7 of the EU Treaty states that in the event of an armed attack on an EU member, the other members are obliged to assist “by all appropriate means”. This Article can be interpreted in a variety of ways, including military assistance. What is the necessity of Sweden and Finland’s membership of NATO?
The two countries’ pursuit of NATO membership following Russia’s full-invasion of Ukraine was driven by a dramatic and sudden change in threat perceptions by the elites of both countries. This was enabled by a change in perception among the public. The latter factor is a key variable. The publics’ desire to abandon formal military neutrality and instead opt for NATO membership provided the necessary legitimacy for the Swedish and Finnish governments to pursue joining the alliance. It might not have happened otherwise; then again, joining NATO has largely been an elite-driven phenomenon in the post-Cold War era.
The key difference between the accession of Finland and Sweden and those of previous enlargement rounds is that the public-facing narrative about pursuing membership was characterized by realist and rationalist calculations: Finland and Sweden opted to bandwagon with the most powerful security actor in Europe, NATO, against the most immediate percieved external threat, Russia. Membership in NATO provided the two countries the best, if the only, way to obtain a national security guarantee. In earlier enlargements, the moves were sold mainly to western publics as a way to enable democracy and spread peace and stability across Europe.
Moreover, and critically, the formerly communist countries which sought NATO membership saw it as a way to gain civilizational belonging within “the West,” as embodied by NATO. NATO membership was percieved as a stamp of approval, as in Brussels proclaiming: “you are now officially part of Europe.” In this round, on the contrary, no one seriously questioned Sweden and Finland’s identities as already firmly part of “Europe” and “the West” — since they had been EU members for nearly two decades. In this manner, it was rational and realist calculations which drove the process in the cases of Finland and Sweden. This was of course a driver for other countries’ pursuit of membership in the late 1990s and early 2000s, but it was never articulated in that fashion in the public discourse.
Regarding the issue of a security guarantee provided through membership in the EU or NATO, it is evident that Sweden and Finland percieved their EU membership as insufficient in meeting their security needs. At the heart of the matter is the fact that Article Five of the NATO charter is underwritten by the United States, specifically the threat of nuclear retaliation if another NATO ally is attacked. Article Five has been invoked only once in NATO’s history, that being after the September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States.
2. What are the competences that Sweden and Finland’s membership brings to NATO, especially in the Baltic Sea and the region?
Both Sweden and Finland’s militaries have been interoperable with NATO forces for many years. They bring modern, sophisticated, and capable militaries, albeit quite small, as compared to the size of the American or Turkish forces, for example. It is probably too early to tell if there will be a dramatic difference in the security situation in the Baltic Sea region, as the two countries were already quasi-NATO members, and therefore informally incorporated into NATO defense planning, before their formal accession. Nonetheless, now NATO defense planners will have the added benefit of including Finnish and Swedish forces into formal force planning scenarios. On the other hand, NATO will also need to determine how to defend the two countries if attacked. This might not have been imaginable before February 2022.
The issue of deterrence and defense is therefore acutely significant in the context of geography: Finland shares a long land border with the Russian Federation and Sweden sits astride key maritime routes in and out of the Baltic Sea region — which are also crucial for Russia’s own security. After the incorporation of the Baltic States into the alliance in 2004, NATO went many years, surprisingly, without having formal defense plans for defending the three countries from external attack. Now, the security situation in Europe is much different, so NATO does not have the luxury of not developing defense and contingency plans for the defense of the two newest members of the alliance.
3. Finland and especially Sweden have a largely self-sufficient defence industry and large and strong active military personnel compared to other EU and NATO countries. If Sweden and Finland have to use NATO weapons as a consequence of NATO membership, what will be the impact and repercussions on the local arms industry and US arms exports?
This remains to be seen. To be sure, bringing Finland and Sweden into NATO opens up a new market for the U.S. defense industry. I suspect, however, that the domestic industries in Finland and Sweden will continue to have a dominant place in those countries. A potential interesting development would be the opposite phenomenon: Nordic defense industries having more exposure and influence in the U.S. market due to the two countries’ membership in NATO.It is of course unknown whether this will happen but it is a trend to look for over the next several years.
4. Finland and Sweden have carefully maintained their neutrality for decades. Although culturally in the Western camp, they have so far refrained from angering their giant nuclear-armed neighbour Russia. Much will change with this accession – will they be safer “inside the tent” under NATO’s collective protection known as “Article 5”?
Of course, the implicit threat of U.S. retaliation, including the use of nuclear weapons, is what underpins Article 5. Finland and Sweden will now formally enjoy such protection. I don’t think any of the so-called frontline NATO states care much about antagonizing Russia at this point. But, then again, threat perceptions can and do vary from country to country within the alliance. NATO has for many years discarded the old the rhetoric about integrating Russia into the European security order, which used to be a mainstay of its official pronouncements. Such rhetoric was still prevalent after the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 but largely disappeared after the annexation of Crimea in 2014.
Moving forward, I suspect Russia will attempt to challenge Article Five through unconventional means, including through the use of cyber attacks, as happened in Estonia in 2007. NATO will have to respond to such incidents carefully and purposefully. For all the percieved protection that Article Five brings, it was written deliberately vague. While NATO members are compelled to aid an ally if it comes under attack, all the other allies are free to choose what sort of assistance they will bring. Thus, triggering an Article Five response does not necessarily mean a military response, strictly speaking.NATO faces many difficult challenges as it approaches it’s 75th anniversary this summer.
