Despite the legacy of close relations between North Korea and the Soviet Union throughout the 1970s, the North Korea-Russia relationship was expressed in terms of “narrow interactionism” and “diplomatic fallacy” until Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s attack on Ukraine in 2022 paved the way for the rapprochement of political needs and material interests between the two countries. So much so that North Korea recognized the regions captured by Russia in Ukraine and provided political support to it.[i]
On the other hand, Russia’s political support for North Korea serves as a barrier against the sanctions that Pyongyang will be subjected to by the United Nations Security Council. Thus, North Korea, isolated from the international system, and Russia, whose relations were restricted by sanctions, developed a relationship of mutual dependence. It is thought that this implicit alliance could balance the US-South Korea-Japan axis that came together at Camp David.
In July 2023, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un welcomed a Russian delegation to Pyongyang, headed by Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, to mark celebrations of the 70th anniversary of the Korean War Armistice Agreement. Then, Kim Jong-un expressed his interest in deepening ties with Moscow in a highly public manner by making a personal visit to Russia on 12 September 2023.[ii] In this way, Russia-North Korea relations have become suitable for a “win-win” situation. At the same time, North Korea may be trying to reduce its economic dependence on China by establishing relations with Russia. Moscow’s increasing presence here can give Pyongyang more clout in its relations with China, and diversify its sources of assistance.[iii]
An October 2023 report noted “dramatic and unprecedented levels of freight car traffic at North Korea’s Tumangang Railway Facility along the North Korea-Russia border.” The dramatic increase in rail traffic likely indicates that North Korea is supplying weapons and ammunition to Russia. Russia will be able to offer advanced military technology to help North Korea develop and expand its military capabilities in exchange for weapons and ammunition. It is thought that Russia’s technical support was behind the successful launch of the North Korean spy satellite into space on November 21, 2023. As a matter of fact, while the spy satellite tests carried out in 2023 failed, the test carried out after the Russian delegation’s visit to Pyongyang was successful.
In his statement on December 15, 2023, North Korean Premier Kim Tok-hun has held talks with the governor of Russia’s far eastern region of Primorsky Krai, Pyongyang’s state media said. There is a amid speculation that North Korea is seeking to send workers to Russia to earn much-needed hard currency.[iv] As a result of the development of bilateral relations, North Korea began to act more boldly militarily. So much so that Seoul is now just an enemy for Pyongyang. In this context, it is observed that there is more tension on the North-South Korean border.
According to the USA’s claim, North Korea is sending weapons to Russia for use in its war with Ukraine. At the beginning of January 2024, an official from the US State Department said, “It is self-contradictory for Russia, a party to the United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) sanctions resolutions against North Korea, to receive North Korean weapons and use them in the war in Ukraine.”[v] Therefore, it is claimed that North Korea-Russia relations developed within the framework of current interests rather than for the long term. The rapprochement between North Korea and Russia, which begins in 2023, may also harm China’s regional interests. Because North Korea’s arms sales to Russia will escalate tensions on the Korean Peninsula. China considers the conflict between the Koreas to be a threat to the security of the country. As a result, North Korea-Russia relations have entered the final turning point. Whether this alliance is permanent or fragile will emerge in the coming months.
[i] Scott A. Snyder, “The Perils of a Renewed North Korea-Russia Relationship”, Council on Foreign Relations,
https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/perils-renewed-north-korea-russia-relationship, (Erişim Tarihi: 07.01.2024)
[ii] Gabriela Bernal, “North Korea–Russia alliance revives Cold War divisions”, East Asia Forum, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2023/10/31/north-korea-russia-alliance-revives-cold-war-divisions/, (Erişim Tarihi: 07.01.2024).
[iii] Peter Brookes, “Russia and North Korea: Similar bed, different dreams”, Geopolitical Intelligence Services (GIS) Report, https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/russia-north-korea/, (Erişim Tarihi: 07.01.2024).
[iv] Lee Minji, “N. Korea’s premier holds talks with visiting Russian governor”, Yonhap News Agency, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20231215001351315?section=search, (Erişim Tarihi: 07.01.2024).
[v] Kim Seung-yeon, “(LEAD) S. Korea urges Russia to stop ‘self-contradictory’ arms deal with N. Korea”, Yonhap News Agency, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240105007251315?section=search, (Erişim Tarihi: 07.01.2024).
