Lately, the most prominent issue in the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC) was the abolishment of the arms embargo of the United States (US), which last over 30 years toward GCASC, in recent months.[1] The main aim of this arms embargo, implied after the Cyprus Peace Operation of Türkiye in 1974, was to prevent an arms race between GCASC and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). However, the Washington administration alleviated the embargo toward GCASC in 2018,[2] and in 2022, it was abolished completely. Therefore, the GCASC started to gain a new perspective on foreign policy and security strategies.
As it is known, due to this embargo, the GCASC made deals with countries such as Israel and Russia, in order to be armed and strengthen its army. Of course, this issue brings several conditions as well. The development of military relations with the GCASC caused the increase of the influence of Moscow in the region. When the historical aims of the Kremlin administration toward the Mediterranean are considered, it can be said that Moscow is concerned about catching every chance to increase its influence in the region.
Even though the GCASC is a member of the European Union (EU) since it is not a member of a collective security organization such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), legally, there is no vengeance in the development of military relations with Russia. In addition, there are economic relations between the sides. However, after the US abolished the arms embargo, the GCASC desired to purchase arms from Washington.[3] Moreover, the Greek Cypriot decision-makers realize that this will cause regional and international problems. For instance, those kinds of steps may cause an escalation of problems with the TRNC.
It is observed some experts claimed in the regional media that the GCASC may be a member of NATO.[4] In addition, in the public polls, it is seen that there is a demand for the GCASC to be a member of NATO.[5] Although membership is unlikely due to the problems with Türkiye and the TRNC, these discussions reveal that the GCASC is in search of new security policies.
On the other hand, in GCASC it is seen that there is a possibility to involve in Russian-Ukrainian War. Some government officials have used some expressions on the increased importance of the GCASC[6], it is understood that the GCASC is hesitant on that issue. For instance, it is discussed that in the conditions of the GCASC purchased arms from the US, it may send old Soviet-made weapons to Ukraine. However, on 13 October 2022, the President of GCASC Nikos Anastasiades rejected this claim and put the final point.[7]
The real aim here is the model applied to Greece. Already, the Athens administration has signed a defense agreement with Berlin and it is agreed to buy Marder 1A3 weapons from Germany and to send old Soviet-made tanks to Ukraine.[8] Similarly, it is expected from the GCASC to modernize its army with American arms and send its old weapons to Ukraine; however, it is seen that GCASC does not lean towards it. The main reason for this is that Greece is a NATO member and has defense support from this organization in a framework. Since the GCASC’s situation is not the same, Nicosia cared about acting more cautiously. Because the GCASC may harm its steps against Russia.
The increasing influence of the US over the GCASC is not an issue that Russia can react to in the current situation. Currently focused on the Ukraine War, Russia’s interest in the Eastern Mediterranean seems to be waning. This, of course, is seen as an advantage by Western allies such as Britain, France, and Italy. This is confirmed by the fact that in the last three months, a large number of military exercises involving these states have been organized off the coast of the island of Cyprus.
As a result, the US lifting of the arms embargo on the GCASC has created a new geopolitical equation. In the past, Moscow has been an important military partner of the GCASC due to this embargo. However, the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War has reversed the picture. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that Russian decision-makers have fully internalized a Euro-Atlantic-centered policy. This is because the SCGA is not a part of NATO and is not expected to become a member of the alliance. For this reason, the GCASC has developed a softer discourse on Russia than Greece.
[1] Ahmet Gençtürk, “‘US Decision to Lift Arms Embargo Will Embolden Greek Cypriot Administration, Lead to Escalation’”, Anadolu Ajansı, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/-us-decision-to-lift-arms-embargo-will-embolden-greek-cypriot-administration-lead-to-escalation-/2687570, (Date of Accession: 31.10.2022).
[2] “H.R.5508-End the Cyprus Arms Embargo Act”, Congress.gov, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5508/text?format=txt, (Date of Accession: 31.10.2022).
[3] “Όπλα από τις ΗΠΑ αγοράζει τώρα η Κύπρος”, Crisis Monitor, https://www.crisismonitor.gr/2022/10/02/opla-apo-tis-ipa-agorazei-tora-i-kypros/, (Date of Accession: 01.11.2022).
[4] Μενέλαος Τασιόπουλος, “Η Κύπρος, το ΝΑΤΟ και το τέλος της κατοχής”, Parapolitika gr, https://www.parapolitika.gr/stiles/menelaos-tasiopoylos/article/1222212/i-kupros-to-nato-kai-to-telos-tis-katohis/, (Date of Accession: 01.11.2022).
[5] Δημοσκόπηση: Ένταξη της Κύπρου στο ΝΑΤΟ προκρίνουν οι πολίτες, Simerini.sigmalive, https://simerini.sigmalive.com/article/2022/10/9/demoskopese-entaxe-tes-kuprou-sto-nato-prokrinoun-oi-polites/, (Date of Accession: 01.11.2022).
[6] Vassilis Nedos, “Ukraine War Bolstering Cyprus’ Positions”, e-Kathimerini, https://www.ekathimerini.com/opinion/interviews/1195774/ukraine-war-bolstering-cyprus-positions/, (Date of Accession: 01.11.2022).
[7] “Ν. Αναστασιάδης: Δεν θα αποστείλει η Κύπρος οπλισμό στην Ουκρανία”, Euronews, https://gr.euronews.com/2022/10/13/anastasiadis-den-tha-aposteilei-h-kypros-oplismo-sthn-oykrania, (Date of Accession: 01.11.2022).
[8] Nikolaus J. Kurmayer & Oliver Noyan, Germany Sends Greece First Tank Batch From Ukraine Swap Deal, Euractiv, https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/news/germany-sends-greece-first-tank-batch-from-ukraine-swap-deal/, (Date of Accession: 01.11.2022).
