On May 18, 2022, Finland and Sweden announced, that they had formally applied to join NATO, the world’s largest military alliance, due to their security concerns over Russia’s war on Ukraine. Having managed to stay neutral during the Cold War, these two countries’ decision to join NATO has been one of the most important changes in the context of European security in decades. Russia which has reacted strongly to the two countries’ decision to join the alliance, in response to NATO’s expansion, claimed that Russia would also install new military bases in the west of the country. In this context, many experts and analysts discuss whether the “9th Enlargement” step that will be carried out by NATO since its founding with the membership of Finland and Sweden will provide security to Europe.
In the light of these developments, Ankara Center for Crisis and Policy Studies (ANKASAM) interviewed Associate Fellow of Chatham House, Dr Anaïs Marin.
- How did the eruption of the Russia-Ukraine war change NATO’s perspectives on European security?
I think it has led to a better understanding that Russia is a revanchist state, and it seeks revenge for what it perceives as a historical injustice. Russia has been a loser in the post-Cold War order, and it wants to challenge it, up to breaking international norms and law, as illustrated by its annexation of Crimea in 2014. As a result, NATO has come to an understanding that Russia is a “threat” to global security, not only for Ukraine but also for NATO member states.
So, this threat perception towards Russia which was already there for countries that used to form part of USSR, such as the Baltic States, is now being felt by the central part of the European Union (EU) too, since the Ukraine invasion. This Russian threat, of which countries such as Germany and France had a “distant understanding” before the aggression on Ukraine suddenly put everybody on the same wave-length. This has led NATO to gain advantages. The fact that Western countries univocally consider a specific country as a threat again, and subsequently marginalize it, has led NATO to appear as more unified, and therefore more resilient.
So far, it has seemed that NATO’s effort to coerce Russia by just preventing it from aggression has run into a wall. At this stage, NATO has to show itself as a military alliance that is ready and capable. As decision-makers in Moscow, especially Russian President Vladimir Putin, are considered as dangerously unpredictable, Western ones feel a need to be prepared for the worst, since threats to peace in Europe can affect security in the whole world. In this context, it has been understood that a strong defence mechanism is needed to prevent and address the wide-ranging side effects of Russia’s war, such as food and energy security, as well as refugees.
- What do you think about Finland and Sweden’s applications to NATO?
I happen to have spent several years in Finland, as a researcher with the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, a think-tank based in Helsinki. When I was there, there were no internal debates regarding NATO membership, but rather a consensus that Finland’s national security was better guaranteed by staying outside of any alliance which Russia perceived as hostile. With the invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, this changed radically, as a result of a cardinal shift in public perception of Russia, and subsequently of Finland’s security interests.
The aggression of Russia against Ukraine has pushed Finland and Sweden to make a U-turn and abandon their non-alignment policies, even though they had been a foundation of their very national identity for generations, if not centuries in the case of Sweden. As for Finland, there is a strong belief that the country managed to preserve its sovereignty during the Cold War, albeit with restrictions in terms of foreign policy (as epitomized by the notion of “Finlandization”), thanks to the choices made after WWII not to lean towards the West, for fear of raising the anger of the big Russian bear. Hence Finland and Sweden applied for joining the European Union only after the Soviet Union had collapsed. .
Finns have a 1340 km long land border with Russia, so it was their understanding that for their own security they should not join NATO, and try playing a balancing role instead, for example within the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which later became the OSCE. However, since the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, and especially after Russia’s aggression on Ukraine since 2014, the situation started changing-up to the radical break-away from the neutrality pledge that we are witnessing this year. Nordic societies are strong parliamentary democracies among other reasons because they are constantly seeking consensus on all policy issues. After the war began, the fact that Swedish and especially Finnish public opinion radically changed attitudes relative to the issue of NATO accession, their governments received a tacit mandate from their constituencies to request a fast-track accession to NATO, without lengthy prior debates domestically or holding a referendum on the issue. In a sense, Mr Putin’s actions prompted a consensus over a process that, before the war, was not even open for debate in Finland and Sweden, and which, ironically, will result in creating exactly what his “special operation” was allegedly meant to prevent – NATO enlargement nearer to Russia’s borders.
- How can the understanding of regional security change if the countries in question are accepted into NATO?
If Sweden and Finland are admitted into NATO, a different understanding of European security can emerge both globally and regionally.
From a global perspective, the inclusion of these countries means a net benefit for NATO. Because these countries, especially Finland, have strong, well-trained and well-equipped armies. Finland is an important addition for NATO because of its reservists – whose preparedness pushes the number of fighting-capable personal to almost 1 million. Also, Finland earned during the Winter War (1939-40) a good experience in fighting the Soviet Army, and retains an understanding of Russian logic and tactics on the field. Further, Finland developed in the past decades a “whole of society” approach to national security, which is a “best practice” that its NATO partners can benefit from too, for preparing their own population, business actors, and administrations, to mobilise and build resilience in the event of a war, or for facing its side-effects, such as (counter-)sanctions. In other words, Finland can share knowledge about civil society capacity-building for meeting the economic, military, medical and social needs of the society in the event of a military, or even a hybrid aggression. . In this framework, Finland’s accession to NATO will bring gains for many more other NATO countries. Considering the long-standing and close cooperation of NATO with Sweden and Finland – which already make their armies inter-operable with NATO ones -, the importance of resilience will be better understood in countries which have, so far, not experienced Russian hybrid warfare.
Regionally, the integration of the two countries into NATO would be a very critical step since it will totally change the military balance in the Baltic Sea. Russia`s A2/AD domination thanks to its military capabilities deployed in Kaliningrad, the Russian exclave, will be seriously challenged. Kaliningrad poses a threat to the Baltic states’ security due to the potential for Russia of isolating their territory from the rest of NATO, should it use its current de facto military occupation of Belarus in order to “bridge” the so-called Suwałki gap – this 90km strip of land in Poland that separates the Union State of Belarus and Russia from the Kaliningrad exclave. Thus, Sweden and Finland’s accession to NATO would rebalance security in the region, by providing the Baltic States with a chance for military support from the North, by sea. If Sweden and Finland become NATO members, Russia will have to forget about launching any “Blitzkrieg” against Poland or the Baltic States altogether. Within this framework, a NATO membership of the two countries would not only bring relief to them but to also other Baltic Sea states. Simply, the accession of these two countries to NATO will convert the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake.
On the other hand, the rapid entry of Finland and Sweden under the NATO umbrella would not only demonstrate NATO’s resilience but would also send Russia a clear message of NATO unity and responsiveness, while also instilling hope in Ukraine that an accelerated accession could potentially be available for Ukraine too.
- Russia’s Foreign Ministry quickly warned that if Finland was accepted into the Alliance Moscow would be forced to respond, including with unspecified “military-technical” measures. What would be the initial steps you expect Russia to take in this context?
In my opinion, Russia will not respond militarily to Finland’s NATO accession pledge, and the Russian Foreign Minister’s threatening statements are only meant to spread fear and doubt about accession. This said until Finland and Sweden are not formally admitted as NATO members, the Article 5 solidarity clause cannot be activated in case they suffer aggression, which of course poses a danger for the next two to three months. However, at this point, I don’t see Russia as willing and less so capable of opening another military front on its Western flank.
Moreover, it is known and appreciated in Moscow that Finland is eager to preserve good neighbourly relations with Russia. Russia cannot and will probably not consider Finland as a threat either, meaning that the risk of it inventing a Finnish threat to its own security is low. Moscow had no security rhetoric against Finland and Sweden. Thus, aggressive statements from the Kremlin or Russian propaganda mouthpieces are nothing more than words. All Russia can do is resort to diplomatic and economic sanctions, such as the discontinuation of Russian gas deliveries to Finland. But Finland is prepared for all this, and has found alternatives to Gazprom’s supplies. Another issue is the very salient threat of a hybrid attack targeting civil society or critical infrastructures, and which would not necessarily qualify as a crime of aggression in international law terms.
Helsinki has followed closely the actions of Russia in Ukraine and other states in the region for many years, including cyber-attacks. It developed resilience and immunity to possible hybrid attacks from Russia, including after learning from the experience of Estonia, which experienced a country-wide cyber-attack attributed to Russia back in 2007 already. Both countries are even prepared to resist a possible attack targeting communication cables beneath the Baltic Sea.
Ten years ago, Finland was still perceived as vulnerable to Russian disinformation, which is another aspect of hybrid warfare. Part of the political elite, whom we wouldn’t call “pro-Russian”, still avoided any discussion or decision that could have been seen by Russians as offending – as they had done during the Cold War when some of them were suspected of actually having been co-opted by the KGB. However, under the current circumstances, any pro-Russian “fifth column” o or Kremlin apologists are clearly a discredited minority and have no influence on any social debate or political decisions. Finland has actually developed an ability in recent years to counter disinformation, criticism and perceptual attacks on the government and its policies, orchestrated by Russian trolls.
Hence I am confident that there is not much Russia can do about NATO enlargement to Finland and Sweden. These countries have been preparing and building resilience against Russian aggression since Crimea’s annexation in 2014. I think it’s therefore unlikely that Russia would venture into a risky attack against these future NATO members. But even if it does take this chance, the response capabilities of the countries in question have improved, and their Western partners will not let them face the Russian threat alone
- How likely is it that we will witness a military conflict between Russia and NATO in the near future? Why do you evaluate it like that?
Globally, the main enemy and target for Russia are still the United States, which is the dominant player within NATO. However, even if it perceives that the United States is using Zelensky as a puppet, it is unlikely that Russia would respond by launching a suicidal fight with NATO. In my opinion, this is close to impossible. Russia is aware that nuclear weapons will come into play if it transgresses the border of any NATO border. If Putin did not totally lose his mind, he will avoid initiating a “Nuclear Armageddon” that would make his own country disappear from the map. I foresee minor conflicts and provocations, possibly creating damage that we have not yet been able to factor in and prevent, but the level of aggression will remain below the threshold that would justify the activation of NATO’s Article 5 solidarity.
